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Summary
As part of the process of joining the
CWC in January 2004, Tripoli made
a declaration to the Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) wherein it declared the
following materials and capabilities,
which were verified by OPCW
inspections. However, on November
1, 2011, the transitional Libyan
government declared a hidden
stockpile of chemical weapons.
Country Profile
Introduction
Libya and chemical weapons have a long
history going back to the 1930s when the
Italian dictator Benito Mussolini authorised
the use of sulphur mustard gas against
Libyan rebels. The decision led to the use of
24 mustard gas bombs on an oasis that was
controlled by the Libyan rebels.1
After decades as a pariah state, Libya was
brought in from the cold following the
December 19, 2003 statement where the
former Libyan dictator, the late Colonel
Qaddafi declared that it would dismantle its
weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
programmes and open the country to
immediate and comprehensive verification
inspections. This announcement followed
many months of secret negotiations that
began with a Libyan offer to the British
officials in March 2003 to give up its WMD
programmes.2 As part of this process, Libya
pledged to eliminate its nuclear and chemical
weapons programmes subject to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
verification.3
As part of the process of joining the CWC in
January 2004, Tripoli made a declaration to
the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) wherein it
declared the following materials and
capabilities, which were verified by OPCW
inspections. These included 24.7 metric
tonnes (MT) of sulphur mustard; 1,390 MT
of precursor chemicals; 3,563 unloaded
chemical weapons munitions (aerial bombs)
and 3 former chemical weapons production
facilities.4
A complex interplay of various factors
influenced the Libyan decision. This ranged
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from economic burden imposed by three
decades of economic sanctions that had
limited oil exports to a great extent. This in
turn resulted in the drying up of new foreign
investment which made giving up the WMD
programmes so much more enticing. This was
buttressed by the fact that Tripoli’s efforts
at procuring nuclear and biological weapons
were not making much headway though it
did possess a ‘moderately capable’ chemical
weapons arsenal.5 Therefore, in the cost-
benefit analysis, the Libyan leadership did
not see much merit in continuing its WMD
programmes.
Between 2004 and February 2011, Libya
destroyed 51% of its sulphur mustard
stockpile and 40% of its precursor chemicals
under OPCW verification. It also irreversibly
destroyed one of the three former chemical
weapons production facilities by razing it to
the ground and converted the other two into
pharmaceutical plants after approval by the
Executive Council of the OPCW.6 Destruction
of the sulphur mustard started in October
2011. However, it was stopped in February
2011 due to breakdown of the heating unit
in the disposal station.7 The situation has not
been remedied as a result of the NATO-led
operations in Libya that began in March 2011
when the OPCW inspectors left Tripoli.
November 2011 disclosures
However, on November 1, 2011, the
transitional Libyan government declared a
“previously undeclared chemical weapons
stockpile”.8 This was confirmed by the
British PM David Cameron at the Lord
Mayors Banquet where he stated, “In the
last few days, we have learnt that the new
Libyan authorities have found chemical
weapons that were kept hidden from the
world.”9 Reports indicated that chemical
weapons were stored at two previously
undeclared sites in violation of the 2003
agreement that the former Libyan dictator
had reached with the international
community. This declaration by the new
Libyan government brought to light several
hundred munitions loaded with sulphur
mustard, few hundred kilograms of sulphur
mustard stored in plastic containers and a
limited number of unfilled plastic containers
(munitions components). The total amount
of sulphur mustard declared by Libya stands
now at 26.3 metric tonnes.
Following the declaration, the OPCW
dispatched its inspectors to Libya. Contrary
to fears about possible use of chemical
weapons by the Qaddafi regime against
rebels, the inspectors did not find any
diversion of the undestroyed sulphur
mustard and precursors.10 On November 28,
2011, the new Libyan authorities officially
submitted a declaration of these materials
to the OPCW.11 This was confirmed by the
OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü at
the opening of the week-long annual
conference of the parties to the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) at in the
Hague.12
Subsequently, another team of OPCW
inspectors visited Libya during January 17-
19, 2012 to verify the previously undisclosed
chemical weapons. The purpose of the
inspection as stated by the OPCW was two-
fold; to “verify the new declaration in terms
of types and quantities of chemical weapons,
and to assist the Libyan authorities in
determining whether another set of
discovered materials is declarable under the
provisions of the Chemical Weapons
Convention”.13
The inspectors found that all the newly
declared materials were stored at the
Ruwagha depot along with quantities of
sulphur mustard and precursor chemicals
that were declared by the Qaddafi
government in 2004. In addition, at the
request of the Libyan authorities the OPWC
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inspectors examined munitions mainly in
form of artillery shells which they




The CWC is the fastest growing regime
amongst the various arms control treaties.
The CWC which entered into force in April
1997 currently has 188 members. Israel and
Myanmar have not ratified the Chemical
Weapons Convention; whereas Angola,
Egypt, North Korea, Somalia, South Sudan,
Syria are amongst the handful of countries
that have neither signed nor acceded to the
CWC.15
Such success is possible as a result of the fact
that the CWC is seen as a non-discriminatory
as well as a serious attempt at combining
arms control and disarmament measures.
The non-discriminatory nature of the CWC
can be gauged from the fact that it treats all
member states equally regardless of whether
they possess chemical weapons or not. This
is in complete variance with the division of
the nuclear ‘haves’ in form of the five nuclear
weapon states (NWS) and the remaining
‘have nots’ as the non-nuclear weapon states
(NNWS). Secondly, the CWC does not grant
any special rights to any individual state
parties. Nor does it have any conditions for
entry into force like the CTBT’s Article XIV
and Annex II which India and other countries
view with great discomfort and suspicion.16
The second feature as stated by Michael
Bothe is the ‘system of compliance control’
or the verification system that by its
comprehensiveness has established the
standard. Bothe correctly points out that the
arms control verification systems designed
under the BWC Verification Protocol and the
CTBT owe much to the CWC system.17
In light of the Libyan case, it is important to
re-look at the existing CWC verification
regime and analyse the reason as to why it
was possible for the Qaddafi regime to keep
the materials disclosed from the OPCW. This
becomes more intriguing because of the fact
that the OPCW inspectors were regularly
present in Libya since 2004 towards
achieving the goal of destroying the declared
chemical weapons stockpile.
The CWC establishes verification systems to
four different obligations, namely the
obligation to destroy chemical weapons in
possession of a country; destroy old or
abandoned chemical weapons; destroy or
convert chemical weapons production
facilities; ensure that toxic chemicals and
their precursors are used only for purposes
not prohibited by the Convention, i.e. are not
diverted to weapons purposes. As Bothe
points out, the first three of these are
disarmament obligations whereas the fourth
obligation is an arms control obligation.18
One issue that the Libyan case brings forth
is that of National Implementation.
Although, having universal membership (or
near universal in CWC’s case) is important,
what is equally important is for states to
implement the treaty’s requirements in
letter and spirit. Having a state like Libya as
member of the CWC is of little use if it is not
adhering to its obligations under the treaty
and is not fully disclosing its chemical
weapons stockpile/arsenal.
Under the CWC a ‘well organised and
transparent’ system of national
implementation, as Sergey Batsanov
describes it, reinforces the compliance
mechanism. To this end, as Batsanov states,
the OPCW has been “…providing assistance
to Member States with national
implementation, including the preparation
and adoption of domestic legislation and
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administrative regulations and setting up
functional national authorities”.19 However,
the CWC has to carefully walk the very thin
line between assistance and impinging on a
state’s sovereign right to make laws. It is
important to dwell on this point further, as
verification involves a fundamental conflict
of interest between the state’s interests to
not be subjected to intrusive verification and
safety of commercial and industrial secrets.
On the other hand, the verification system
must be able to detect any non-compliance.
Conclusion
There are four types of routine inspections
under the CWC, all of which are based on
national declarations. The national
declarations (Article III), detailing the
locations and quantities of chemical weapons
and production facilities, thus form the
starting point of the verification process.
Under the Verification Annex, which is the
most voluminous sections of the CWC, states
are obliged to declare all facilities where
specific chemicals are handled in specific
quantise. These are the sites where routine
inspections are conducted.
However, the inherent problem in such a
method is that the only way to check whether
all the relevant sites are declared by a state
is through challenge inspections.
Interestingly, there has never been an
instance where an ad hoc (challenge)
inspection has been carried out under the
CWC. In a case like the Libyan one,
ascertaining the completeness of the
declaration becomes critical. Currently,
under the CWC, the OPCW selects the sites
to be inspected either by comprehensive on-
site inspection of all sites, random selection
or selection based on qualitative thresholds
etc.20 Thus, on-site inspections form a key
element in establishing the completeness and
correctness of the national declarations made
by state parties. It is as a result of the above
that the CWC lays out in great detail the
requirement relating to national
declarations.21
It is crucial to ensure that the Technical
Secretariat updates the approved inspection
equipment list, of course, in consultation with
Member States. Given that the CWC does
not lay down a procedure or a mechanism to
achieve this, it has proved difficult to achieve
an agreement among State Parties on the
need to update the approved inspection
equipment list.22 The need for the inspectors
to be armed with the latest equipment
becomes much more important when they
are dealing with a state like Libya. However,
not all problems with verifying the contents
at a particular site are equipment related.
In many cases, the analyses techniques used
like radiography, using portable X-ray
equipment, ultrasonic pulse echo have their
own particular advantages and
disadvantages. It is therefore a continuing
challenge to identify the stored munitions
with a high degree of confidence at the least
expense of resources.
The Libyan case points to the necessity to
take remedial measures to strengthen the
OPCW’s ability to check the veracity of the
national declarations made by states. This
becomes doubly important in cases such as
Libya. Central in this regard is the
continuous training of the organisation’s
inspectorate, which has faced problems as a
result of financial and other constraints.
Simultaneously, updating of the approved
inspection equipments and working to
develop newer, safer and more cost-effective
ways to establish the contents of a chemical
weapon munition are needed to make the
CWC more effective. The international
community would stand in good stead if it
remembers, former US President Ronald
Regan’s mantra, “Trust, but Verify.” This
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holds the key to a stronger CWC and ensuring
that the regime does not have to bear the
brunt of any more surprises.
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